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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider two cases. In the first case, you represent the children of a
woman who was intentionally and wrongfully killed by her husband. After
having pled guilty to negligent homicide, the husband probates his wife's will
in which he is the sole beneficiary. In the second case, your client attempts
an online transfer of her savings to another of her accounts but enters the
account number erroneously and sends her life's savings to a stranger's
account. The recipient of this windfall has withdrawn the money in cashier's
checks and refuses to return them to her.
Your clients want a court to order the properties' transfer to them.
Unfortunately, the frequently stated Texas rule appears to bar the
constructive trust remedy they seek in both of these cases. When strictly
applied, this "three-element rule" requires a plaintiff seeking a constructive
Texas Tech Law Review Volume 50, Book 3 Lead Article.
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; LL.M., University of Texas, Austin,
1973; J.D., University of Texas, Austin, 1967; B.A., University of Texas, Austin, 1965.
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trust to prove: (1) that the defendant acquired property from the plaintiff
through either breach of trust or fraud, (2) that allowing the defendant to
retain the property would unjustly enrich him, and (3) that the defendant
currently possesses the plaintiffs property or its traceable product.
Neither of the clients in these hypotheticals can prove acquisition of
their property by breach of trust or fraud. The rule would seemingly deny
them a constructive trust, leaving only the possibility of a monetary award.
Although the Supreme Court of Texas has referred to this three-element rule
as "generally required," the Court's decisions support a different approach.
Those decisions indicate that the Texas Supreme Court is very likely to
approve a constructive trust in both of these hypothetical cases.
In this Article, the Author argues that the stated rule should be modified
to reflect those decisions. Such a modified rule would avoid the confusion
caused by the three-element rule and free the constructive trust to better
perform its function of protecting property rights.
II. THESIS

The Supreme Court of Texas has approved a constructive trust for the
heirs described in the first-the slayer-hypothetical. 1 The Court has in fact
ruled that a constructive trust can be used to return property acquired through
a much wider array of wrongful conduct than breach of trust or fraud.2 And
as described in the body of this Article, the Texas Supreme Court has
expressed approval of a constructive trust for the second hypotheticalmistaken payment-even when the defendant is innocent of wrongdoing.3
In reality, the Texas Supreme Court's decisions differ greatly from the
three-element rule.4 Instead, the Court decides cases in a manner that more
closely resembles the guidelines stated in the Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.' The Restatement declares that a
1. See Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1978).
2. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2017).
3. See Zundell v. Gess, 10 S.W. 693, 694 (Tex. 1889). Wrongdoing does have an effect on the
measurement of restitution. See infra Part VI. For example, one who profits as a result of his breach of a
fiduciary duty can be made to disgorge those profits. See ERI Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318
S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. 2010). Those profits can be represented by the enhanced value of identifiable
property acquired by the defendant at the plaintiffs expense. See id at 871-72. "[]f the defendant is a
conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary, [a] constructive trust will often offer the most efficient
means to strip the defendant of wrongful gains." RESTATEMENT (THiRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST

ENRICHMENT § 55 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2011). When an innocent defendant will be unjustly enriched
at the plaintiff's expense, the plaintiff can recover only the unenhanced value of the benefit acquired:
"Against an innocent recipient, restitution from [such] property . . . will be accomplished .. . by equitable
lien instead of constructive trust." Id If, for example, an innocent recipient invests a mistaken payment
in what is now a more valuable asset, the plaintiff can obtain a monetary award equal to the initial benefit
secured by an equitable lien on that asset. See id
4. See generally Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d 411; Bounds, 560 S.W.2d 925; Zundell, 10 S.W. 693.
5. Compare Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d 411, and Bounds, 560 S.W.2d 925 (imposing constructive trusts
upon the property owner's death at the hand of the beneficiary and the beneficiary's undue influence to
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constructive trust will lie "[i]f a defendant is unjustly enriched by the
acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or
in violation of the claimant's rights . . . ."6 This quote describes only two
requirements for a constructive trust: tracing to "identifiable" property in the
defendant's hands and proof that retention of that property would unjustly
enrich him.' Furthermore, the Restatement recognizes alternate grounds for
the requirement of unjust enrichment-either proof of defendant's wrongful
retention of another's property or proof of his wrongful acquisition of that
property.
The pattern in Texas Supreme Court decisions has been obscured by the
complications that arise from the application of statutory directives.9 The
Court has long refused to allow a constructive trust to alter a statutory
outcome unless that outcome was accomplished through wrongdoing.10 For
example, courts have allowed a constructive trust to enforce promises invalid
under the Statute of Frauds, but only when they arose from a breach of
fiduciary duty or fraud."
For clarity in the law and for the protection of property rights, it is
necessary to recognize that the Court's analysis significantly modifies the
three-element rule. 12 That modified rule-which is the actual Texas ruleallows a constructive trust under the following circumstances.
As a general rule, a plaintiff can obtain a constructive trust by proving
that:
(1) the defendant holds legal title to identifiable property acquired at the
expense of the plaintiff or to its traceable product, and
(2) allowing the defendant to retain this property would constitute unjust
enrichment. However, if the constructive trust alters a statutory
outcome, the plaintiff can satisfy the unjust-enrichment requirement
only by proving the defendant caused that outcome through
wrongdoing."

transfer property of an individual with mental incapacity), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (defining broadly the scope inder which a
constructive trust forms).
6.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 55

(AM. LAW INST. 2011)

(emphasis added).
7. See id.
8. See id. at § 55 cmt. b. The Restatement's commentary notes that the modern law no longer
requires "that the parties have ever occupied a fiduciary or confidential relation." See id.
9. See Faville v. Robinson, 227 S.W. 938 (Tex. 1921).
10. See id (refusing to apply the Statute of Frauds because the promise made was fraudulent).
11. See, e.g., Medows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. 1974).
12. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411,424 (Tex. 2017) (rejecting the defendant's interpretation
of the three-element rule as too narrow).
13. See id.; see also Holmes v. Kent, 221 S.W.3d 622, 628-29 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (finding a
constructive trust inapplicable for an optional annuity payment because equity and justice did not require
this).
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First, tracing-that is, proof the defendant holds identifiable property
taken at the expense of the plaintiff-is always essential in proving the
plaintiffs superior equitable title. 14 The judicial remedy only enforces
equitable ownership to specific, existing property." Second, in general, the
unjust-enrichment requirement can be satisfied by proof of the defendant's
wrongful acquisition of the plaintiff's property,1 6 but even innocent recipients
of that property can be unjustly enriched."
However, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acquired her property
because of wrongdoing if the constructive trust divests her of a benefit
conferred by statute.' 8 For example, failure to execute a will causes one's
estate to pass according to the statute of descent and distribution.' 9 This
statute determines who benefits from the estate, and those beneficiaries, even
if unintended recipients, are not thereby unjustly enriched.20 In contrast, if
some of those heirs had wrongfully prevented the will's execution, the
beneficiary under the will can prove his or her unjust enrichment. 21 In
deciding a similar situation in Pope v. Garrett, the Texas Supreme Court
found all of the heirs unjustly enriched, stating that "[b]ut for the wrongful
acts [even] the innocent defendants would not have inherited interests in the
property."2 2 The constructive trust can thereby nullify the manipulative
effect of the wrongful conduct while not undermining the applicable statutory
policies.2 3

14. See, e.g., Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank, 82 S.W.3d 40, 41-42 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
no pet.) (detailing the record of ownership of certain funds).
15. See id This focus is essential to the judicial remedy, but a statute may authorize a constructive
trust without requiring tracing to property currently in the trustee's hands. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 9.011(b) (West 2017). For example, the Texas Family Code allows a court to impose a
constructive trust to secure a party's rights to property not currently possessed by another but to be
acquired in the future, such as pension payments. See id.
16. See Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1948). Either breach of a fiduciary duty, or
fraud, for example, always satisfy the unjust-enrichment requirement needed to enable a court to enter a
constructive trust. See id However, listing both these forms of wrongful acquisition and proof of unjust
enrichment as requirements for a constructive trust effectively makes the unjust-enrichment requirement
superfluous. See infra Section VII.B (explaining this reasoning).
17. See, e.g., Castano, 82 S.W.3d at 40 (upholding a constructive trust that returned $203,000
mistakenly transferred funds to the account of an innocent recipient).
18. See Holmes, 221 S.W.3d at 628-29.
19. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.001-003 (West 2017).
20. See Holmes, 221 S.W.3d at 629.
21. See id
22. Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948).
23. See id. In discussing the balancing of the right to restitution against the unenforceability of an
oral agreement, the Restatement describes the use of wrongful conduct as a clumsy test. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 31

cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011).

The Restatement does, however, distinguish the generalized directive of a Statute of Frauds from a more
precisely targeted statute. Id. Restitution to enforce agreements barred by the latter is more likely to
undermine the statute's policies. See id. at § 31 cmt. h. Even in Statute-of-Frauds cases, however, the
Texas Supreme Court has avoided open-ended balancing by requiring wrongdoing of some sort to justify
the alteration of a statutorily directed outcome. See Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 561. This approach has at least
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III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST MECHANICS

A. JudicialRemedy
The courts of equity created the law of trusts, which made possible the
separation of legal and equitable ownership. 24 As it developed, the law of
trusts allowed an owner to convey property's legal title to a trustee but
required that trustee to use the property for the benefit of another-the
equitable owner.25 Allowing a trustee this control over legal title also made
misuse of that power possible.2 6 To counter such dangers, equity created a
right of action founded on the equitable obligation of a trustee to act in good
conscience.27 Fiduciary duties were imposed to describe this obligation in
more detail.28 The fiduciary relationship also imposed a presumption of
unfairness that placed the burden of rebuttal on any trustee who profited at
the trust's expense. 2 9
The constructive trust remedy originally enforced a trustee's obligations
in the context of an express trust." If, for example, the trustee acquired legal
title to property that, in equity, belonged to the trust, a court could declare the
formal trustee a "constructive trustee," holding that property for the benefit
of the trust.3 1 Trustees invariably argue that they hold such property in their
own name and for their own benefit, but a constructive trust is imposed as a
matter of law without regard to the intentions of the parties.3 2
These origins and the continued use of trust language have to some
degree induced a belief in a limited role for the remedy. However, the
modern constructive trust operates well beyond the realm of express trusts. 3 3
It provides a means for returning property to its rightful owners and
preventing the defendant's unjust enrichment.3 4 A constructive trust allows
this specific restitution only when a plaintiff can "trace" her right of

the potential of greater predictability, and it demands a greater level of respect for legislative decisions.
See id.
24.

See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION

§ 2.1(1)

(2d

ed., West Publishing Co. 1993). The courts of equity used the principle of good conscience and its
injunctive power to mold the remedies it used to enforce the trust relationship. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id
28. See id. at § 4.3(2).
29. See, e.g., Int'l Bankers Life Ins. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex. 1963) (stating that
officers of a corporation are fiduciaries and have the burden of proving the fairness of any profit made at
the corporation's expense).
30. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at § 2.1(1).
31. See id
32. See Int'1Bankers Life, 368 S.W.2d at 590.
33. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at § 4.3(2).
34. See Int'l Bankers Life, 368 S.W.2d at 597.
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ownership to existing, identified property held by the defendant. 3 5 After
proving this right, the final stage of the remedy is a mandatory injunction that
commands a defendant to return the property to the plaintiff.36
This injunction, issued as an in personam order directed to the
defendant, is enforceable through a court's contempt power.37 The sanctions
of contempt can include fines and incarceration, and these potential
The power of the court thus
punishments tend to encourage compliance.
lies behind enforcement of a constructive trust, and a plaintiff obtains the
remedy while avoiding the risks and burden of executing a judgment.39 In
addition, a constructive trust gives the plaintiff priority over unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy4 0 or over other competing creditors.4 1 Although it
does not override title transferred to a bona fide purchaser,42 it can attach to
the proceeds of that sale held by the defendant. 43 A monetary judgment offers
none of these benefits and cannot therefore be considered an adequate
alternative.
B. Statutory Remedies
Although beyond the scope of this Article, numerous statutes authorize
a constructive trust for violations of their substantive provisions. The text of
such statutes controls the remedy's application and, if conflicting, will
override judicial restrictions.45 On the other hand, courts assume a statutory
35. See In re Hayward, 480 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (holding that a
constructive trust cannot be imposed on unidentifiable cash proceeds).
36. See id. Although a constructive trust is a remedy issued in the court's decree, that decree
recognizes equitable ownership that existed at the time of the relevant transaction. See id. As a
consequence, the plaintiffs equitable title would be protected from the time of that transaction. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 55

cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2011);

see also George P. Roach, Unjust Enrichment in Texas: Is It a Floor Wax or a Dessert Topping?, 65
BAYLOR L. REv. 153, 229-30 (2013) (explaining that a constructive trust comes into existence when the
defendant "unjustly obtains legal title"). It is from this point that one calculates profits made from the
property and that initiates the beneficiary's priority over creditors. See id. at 230.
37. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 597 (Tex. 2005); ExpartePreston, 347 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex.
1961); In re R.E.D., 278 S.W.3d 850, 860 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
38. See Exparte Preston, 347 S.W.2d at 943 (holding that a husband who held community property
as a constructive trustee could be incarcerated for his refusal to pay that money).
39. See id.
40. See Haber Oil Co. v. Swinchart (In re Haber Oil Co.), 12 F.3d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 1994).
41. See Marathon Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Davis-Lynch, Inc., 400 S.W.3d 133, 136-37 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding a constructive trust attached to property purchased with
stolen funds).
42. See MBank Waco, N.A. v. L. & J., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ
denied).
43. See Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 133 (Tex. 1974).
44. See generally Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761, 762-63 (Tex. 1982).
45. If a statute's language provides the conditions for application of a statutory constructive trust, it
would necessarily override contrary judicial limits. However, in the absence of a comprehensive
explanation, a statutory constructive trust could incorporate elements of that remedy as found in court
decisions. See, e.g., Morton v. Nguyen, 412 S.W.3d 506, 510-11 (Tex. 2013) (holding that the statutory
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remedy adopts the elements of the comparable judicial remedy if its
provisions do not say otherwise.4 6 For example, the Texas Trust Act lists a
constructive trust as one of the remedies for a trustee's breach, or imminent
breach, of an express trust." This provision does not elaborate on the
guidelines for its application, and one assumes court-made rules would
apply.48 However, this constructive trust remedies a breach of a fiduciary
duty, and the three-element rule would not restrict its intended application.49
Section 9.011(b) of the Texas Family Code states, somewhat
mysteriously, that the "subsequent actual receipt by the non-owning party of
property awarded to the owner in a decree of divorce or annulment
... imposes a constructive trust on the property for the benefit of the
owner." 50 This language allows a court's use of a constructive trust to protect
an ex-spouse's right to a percentage of future pension payments. Unlike
the court-made remedy, this statute expressly authorizes a court to impose a
constructive trust on funds that do not exist in the hands of the non-owning
party at the time of the decree.52 In contrast, § 9.009 of the Family Code
authorizes a court to order delivery of specific existing property, which
satisfies this requirement of the court-made remedy. 5 3 In addition, § 9.012(a)
of the Family Code provides for the use of contempt against one who violates
either the order authorized in § 9.011(b) or the order authorized in § 9.009.5 4
Section 356.655 of the Texas Estates Code creates a cause of action for
anyone who has an interest in an estate. 5 It expressly allows these interested
parties to seek the return of estate property purchased by a representative of
the estate.56 Although not labeled a constructive trust, this order performs
that remedy's essential function-it restores specific property to the estate.
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows a constructive trust
in a civil case to enforce laws against civil racketeering related to the
remedy of rescission included the element of mutual rescission); Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc., 364
S.W.3d 817, 826-27 (Tex. 2012) (holding that the DTPA's allowance of rescission included the
common-law requirements of mutual rescission).
46. See Morton, 412 S.W.3d at 511. "Allowing a buyer to recover all benefits bestowed upon the
seller upon rescission without also requiring the buyer to surrender the benefits that he received under the
contract would result in a windfall inconsistent with the general nature of Subchapter D's
cancellation-and-rescission remedy." See id.
47. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.008(a)(9) (West 2017).
48. See id.
49. See generally id.
50. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.011(b) (West 2017).
51. See id.
52. See id One could argue that the decree establishes the owning party's vested interest in the
future payments at issue. That existing interest need only be traced to subsequently received funds. See
generally id The statute's controlling text, however, makes this argument unnecessary. See generally id
53. See FAM. CODE § 9.009.
54. See id. at § 9.012(a).
55. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 356.655(b)(3) (West 2017).
56. See id
57. See id.
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trafficking of persons.58 Also related to the civil enforcement of criminal
laws, several Texas statutes impose a constructive trust to implement the
so-called slayer rule.5 9 For example, § 844.404(a) of the Texas Government
Code bars the Texas County and District Retirement System from paying any
benefit to a beneficiary who causes the death of a family member.60 Section
844.404(c) provides that if such a beneficiary has received these benefits he
"holds all payments received in constructive trust for the rightful
recipient." 6 1 In a similar manner, § 1103.151 of the Texas Insurance Code
declares that a life insurance beneficiary forfeits his interest if he is a principal
or an accomplice in "wilfully bringing about the death of the insured." 6 2
Section 1103.152 allows a contingent beneficiary not implicated in the killing
to take the life insurance proceeds.63 If no such beneficiary exists,
§ 1103.152(c) allows the nearest relative of the insured to recover the
benefits.6 4 These parties can thereby use a constructive trust to divest the
guilty beneficiary of legal title and to turn over any benefits received.6 5
IV. THE THREE-ELEMENT RULE
A. KCM Financial, LLC v. Bradshaw
Unlike these statutory constructive trust remedies, the court-made
remedy depends on judicial rules and restrictions. 6 6 The most troublesome
restriction on the constructive trust is the three-element rule mentioned in the
introduction.6 7 Among the three elements, the first imposes the least justified
restriction by requiring every plaintiff seeking a constructive trust to prove
the defendant acquired her property through either a breach of trust or fraud.68
The other elements of the rule-the tracing and unjust-enrichment
requirements-relate to the essential characteristics of this equitable remedy
rather than to its distant origins.69

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 140.004(a) (West 2017).
See, e.g., TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 844.404(a) (West 2017).
Id.
Id. at § 844.404(c).
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1103.151 (West 2017).
See id.
64. See id. at § 1103.152(c).
65. See Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. 1978). Although the Texas Supreme Court
approved the use of a constructive trust, it reversed the judgment for other reasons. See id. at 929-30.
66. See supra Part I (introducing the three-element rule).
67. See supraPart I.
68. See supraPartI. The older Statute of Frauds cases appear to give support for this first element.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Strong, 213 S.W.3d 979, 980-81 (Tex. 1948) (ruling that a constructive trust is
enforceable due to a breach of fiduciary duties). However, the Texas Supreme Court has recently both
repeated this element and ignored it. See, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 424 (Tex. 2017)
(rejecting a strict interpretation ofthe first element).
69. See supraPart I (explaining introducing the elements of the three-element rule).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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Until very recently, a full elaboration of the three-element rule had
appeared only in Texas courts of appeals' opinions. 7 0 The rule's
restrictiveness was presumably secured by insisting on proof of each element
In 2014, the Texas Supreme Court also appeared to adopt
in every case.
the three-element rule.72 In KCMFinancial,LLC v. Bradshaw, it stated that:
Three elements are generally required for a constructive trust to be imposed
under Texas law. The party requesting a constructive trust must establish
the following: (1) breach of a special trust or fiduciary relationship or actual
or constructive fraud; (2) unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer; and (3) an
identifiable res that can be traced back to the original property. 73
The court noted that, "In weighing the imposition of a constructive trust, a
court will identify whether a wrongful taking has occurred." 74 Although
implied by the first element, this language emphasized the wrongfully
acquired property requirement.
In 1960, the parents of Betty Lou Bradshaw sold the Mitchell Ranch and
reserved one-half of any royalty interest that might be obtained in a future
lease of the minerals for her.7 Her parents also required that any mineral
lease reserve no less than a one-eighth royalty interest, thereby preserving for
her a minimum royalty interest of one-sixteenth. Steadfast Financial, which
later became KCM Financial, ultimately took ownership of the Mitchell
Ranch's surface and mineral estates.
As the mineral estate owner, Steadfast possessed the executive power to
enter into and amend oil and gas leases subject to Bradshaw's overriding
one-half interest in any royalty. In exercising this power, Steadfast entered
a mineral lease with Range Productions in which it reserved a one-eighth
royalty interest.8 0 As a result, Bradshaw received the minimum one-sixteenth
70. See In re Hayward, 480 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (citing KCM Fin.
LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2014)); Hsin-Chi-Su v. Vantage Drilling Co., 474 S.W.3d
284, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); Gray v. Sangrey, 428 S.W.3d 311, 315
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. denied); In re Marriage ofHarrison, 310 S.W.3d 209,212 (Tex. App.Amarillo 2010, pet. denied); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 533 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009,
pet. denied); In re Lemons, 281 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2009, no pet.); Cote v. Texcan
Ventures II, 271 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); Hubbard v. Shankle, 138 S.W.3d
474, 485 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 681 n.27 (Tex.
App-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
71. See, e.g., Hubbard, 138 S.W.3d at 485 (upholding denial of constructive trust because there was
no breach of fiduciary duty or fraud).
72. See KCMFin. LLC, 457 S.W.3d at 87.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 75.
77. See id. at 75 n.2.
78. See id. at 77 n.4.
79. See id. at 75.
80. See id. at 78.
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royalty interest reserved for her by her parents." Steadfast obtained the
remaining one-sixteenth royalty interest, which it assigned to a group referred
to as the "Royalty Owners" by the Supreme Court.8 2
Although Steadfast had to share the royalty interest with Bradshaw, it
did not have to share any bonuses. 83 Bradshaw's dissatisfaction with the
lease arose because Steadfast allegedly failed to demand the then-market
rate-a one-fourth royalty interest. 84 She contended that Steadfast bargained
away this higher royalty, which it would have shared with her, in exchange
for an unusually high lease bonus of more than $13 million, which it did not
share with her.8 5 Bradshaw sued Steadfast, the Royalty Owners, and others.8
She claimed that Steadfast breached the duty of good faith required by its
executive authority, and she sought a constructive trust on the one-sixteenth
royalty interest that it had assigned to the Royalty Owners.8 7
The trial court entered summary judgments on behalf of Steadfast and
the Royalty Owners. In its decision, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the
summary judgment for the Royalty Owners, but reversed the judgment
entered in favor of Steadfast.89 The Court concluded that Steadfast owed
Bradshaw a duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing, even though it did not
have to put her interests ahead of its own. 90 The Court therefore affirmed the
court of appeals' remand of Bradshaw's breach-of-trust claim for trial. 91
Bradshaw argued that Steadfast's failure to obtain the one-fourth royalty
reduced the value of her one-half interest in royalties from a one-eighth
royalty interest (one half of a one-fourth royalty) to a one-sixteenth royalty
interest (one half of a one-eighth royalty).92 Steadfast's breach of duty, she
reasoned, therefore cost her a one-sixteenth royalty interest, which equaled
the interest assigned by Steadfast to the Royalty Owners.9 3 Under this logic,
she believed that the Royalty Owners should hold their one-sixteenth interest
as constructive trustees for her benefit. 94 Combining their one-sixteenth
royalty interest with her one-sixteenth royalty interest would give her the
one-eighth interest she would have obtained if Steadfast had not engaged in
self-dealing.9 5
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
See id at 75.
See id. at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 86-87.
Id.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 82-84.
Id at 85.
See id. at 78.
Id
Id
See id. at 88.
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The Court denied her request for a constructive trust on the interest held
by the Royalty Owners. 96 It did so because she failed to trace property taken
from her to the royalties and royalty interest obtained by the Royalty
Owners.9 7 In the original transfer of the Mitchell Ranch, her parents reserved
for her one half of any royalty interest obtained in a mineral lease.98 They
sold the other one-half interest along with the surface estate.9 9 Her
constructive-trust claim thus targeted property that she never owned.100 The
one-sixteenth royalty interest held by the Royalty Owners was not traceable
to, or derived from, any interest in royalties that she obtained through her
parents' reservation. 10 1 Her constructive-trust claim, therefore, failed as a
matter of law because she could not satisfy the tracing requirement of the
rule.1 02

One might be confused by the possibilities raised by the Court's remand
of Bradshaw's breach-of-trust claim for trial. If she proved Steadfast's
breach of duty, she would satisfy the first element of the three-element rule
and, perhaps, the second as well. However, she would still be unable to prove
her equitable ownership of the interests held by the Royalty Owners. She
never held any right to the property they obtained by Steadfast's
assignments. 103
The Court's recitation of the three-element rule was obiter dictum-at
least to the extent of the first two elements.1 04 However, statements of law
made by the highest state court cannot be dismissed merely because they
were not essential to its holding. 0 5 One can, however, note that the Court
did not evaluate the first element of the rule and that it only recognized that
element as "generally required."106

96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. The Court makes clear that a constructive trust cannot be imposed Qn property that is not
traceable to property taken from the plaintiff. See id at 87. Therefore, Steadfast's breach of its duty and
any resulting unjust enrichment were individually and in combination insufficient to support a constructive
trust. See id. at 90. Although this point was not decided, the failure of Steadfast to obtain a one-fourth
royalty interest reduced rather than enhanced the interest assigned to the Royalty Owners. See generally
id. at 86-90.
105. See Elledge v. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
In this case, the court of appeals referred to contrary statements by the Texas Supreme Court as obiter
dictum and applied the four-year statute of limitations to an unjust enrichment claim. Id at 870. The Court
responded that, "Our statements that the two-year statute applies to unjust enrichment claims, though not
essential to the outcomes in [two of its decisions], should have been followed." Id.
106. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2017).
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B. Kinsel v. Lindsey
In May of 2017, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kinsel
v. Lindsey. 107 The defendants in this case argued that the trial court's
constructive trust should be set aside because the evidence failed to establish
either a breach of trust or fraud.108 This absence seemingly required reversal
of the constructive trust in light of the elements "generally required" under
the three-element rule. 109 The Court responded by noting that this argument
"views the permissible bases for a constructive trust too narrowly." 110 The
Court explained its broader interpretation by noting that in KCMFinancialit
had also "reaffirmed [its] statement in Pope that '[t]he specific instances in
which equity impresses a constructive trust are numberless-as numberless
as the modes by which property may be obtained through bad faith and
unconscientious acts."'" 1
[In Pope, t]here was no need to establish a "special trust or fiduciary
relationship" between the intended beneficiary and the heirs-at-law or
establish that the heirs-at-law defrauded the decedent. Neither finding
would be applicable to the facts at hand, and the justification for a
1 12
constructive trust is not so constrained.
Lesey Kinsel created an inter vivos trust as part of her estate plan and
deeded to this trust the 60% interest she owned in her ranch. 1 3 Prior to its
fourth and fifth amendments and to the sale of the ranch, the trust apportioned
Lesey's 60% interest to named stepchildren and step grandchildren.1 14 The
residuary clause of the trust left everything else to her niece Jane Lindsey,
who was also a co-trustee.115
In 2005, at the age of 92, Lesey moved from Beaumont to an
assisted-living facility located in Fort Worth, where Jane and her brother Bob
lived.1 1 6 In 2007, Lesey executed a fourth amendment to her trust, leaving
the mineral estate in her interest in the ranch equally to Jane and Bob."11 In
2008, at Lesey's request, the owners of the other 40% of the ranch joined her
in selling the ranch, and the trust received over $3 million from the sale of

107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id at 425-26.
110. See id at 425.
111. Id. at 426.
112. Id (emphasis added).
113. See id. at 415.
114. See id Many of these individuals also shared ownership of the remaining 40% interest in the
ranch. Id.
115. See id.
116. See id
117. Id. at 416.
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her 60% interest.' 18 Shortly before she died in 2008, Lesey executed a fifth
amendment to her trust that removed all mention of the ranch.1 1 9 Therefore,
when she died, the trust by its terms passed the $3 million in sales proceeds
to Jane as the residual beneficiary. 12 0
Prior to the amendments and the sale of the ranch, the stepchildren and
step grandchildren would have received Lesey's interest in the ranch. 12 1
After her death, they had no right to receive any portion of the proceeds from
the sale of Lesey's interest. 12 2 Members of this group (the Kinsels) sued Jane
Lindsey and others seeking damages and a constructive trust on the $3
million in proceeds from the sale of Lesey's interest. 12 3 The plaintiffs
asserted claims of tortious interference with their inheritance, statutory and
common law fraud, and conspiracy.1 24
The jury concluded that Jane had unduly influenced Lesey, who lacked
the mental capacity to understand the consequences of her actions. 1 25 Jane
had used her influence to convince Lesey to modify the trust and to sell the
ranch. 12 6 Based on the jury's findings, the trial judge entered judgment for
damages, attorney's fees, and a constructive trust on the sales proceeds held
by the trust.1 2 7 The Texas Supreme Court upheld the jury finding that Lesey
lacked capacity to understand the nature of her acts and upheld the trial
court's issuance of a constructive trust. 128 However, the Court affirmed the
court of appeals in reversing the damages awarded on the alleged causes of
action and the attorney's fees award. 12 9
First, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to provide any
evidence of out-of-pocket damages caused by the defendants' fraud, and that
the trial court's instruction in this regard was harmful error.130 The Court
also held that Texas does not currently recognize a cause of action for tortious
interference with inheritance, and it refused to create one when the
constructive trust was an adequate alternative. 13 1 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that it had approved a tortious interference with
inheritance claim in its Pope decision. 132 That case, the Court noted, involved
118. Id. at 417.
119. Id. at 418-20.
120. See id. at 418.
121. See id. at 415.
122. See id at 418.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. See id
126. See id at 421.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 423.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 421-22.
131. See id. at 424.
132. See id. at 423-24. In Anderson v. Archer, the court of appeals refused to recognize a damages
cause of action for tortious interference with an inheritance and held that the Texas Supreme Court had
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one of the many instances in which a court, acting in equity, could impose a
constructive trust on property obtained through "unconscientious acts."133
In upholding the jury's undue-influence and lack-of-capacity findings
in Kinsel, the Court recognized that these justified setting aside the fourth and
fifth amendments to the trust and the deed of sale. 134 However, the Court
noted that undue influence was not an independent tort cause of action. 135
The undue-influence finding did provide grounds for setting aside Lesey's
otherwise valid acts and documents. 13 6 As a result, the Court held the jury's
"mental-incapacity finding, coupled with the undue-influence finding,
provided a more than adequate basis for the trial court to impose a
constructive trust."1 37 The undue-influence finding thereby revealed how the
defendants would be unjustly enriched by retention of the proceeds from a
now-invalid sale.1 38
In approving the constructive trust in Kinsel, the Court necessarily
broadened the justifications for a constructive trust.13 9 No effort was made
to characterize the undue-influence contention as a breach of trust or fraud.140
The Court conceded that, in KCMFinancial, it did recognize that breach of
trust or fraud were "generally" necessary for a constructive trust. 14 1
Nevertheless, it concluded that it.had approved a constructive trust as a
remedy for a much wider array of wrongs.142
However, the Court did not describe the cause of action that supported
the constructive trust in Kinsel or in Pope.14 3 In Kinsel, the Court affirmed
the court of appeals' rejection of the plaintiffs' fraud, tortious interference
with inheritance, and conspiracy causes of action. 144 In addition, it rejected
the plaintiffs' contention that they were due damages under an
undue-influence cause of action.145 And even after rejecting these four
possible causes of action, the Court approved the trial court's judicial remedy

not accepted this cause in Pope. See Anderson v. Archer, 490 S.W.3d 175, 177-78 (Tex. App.-Austin
2016, pet. granted).
133. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 423. Because a tortious interference claim could not support the
constructive trust in Pope, one can fairly ask what cause of action could. See generally Pope v. Garrett,
211 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1948). As discussed below, the actual cause of action is best described as one to
prevent unjust enrichment of the heirs who, in Pope, received the decedent's estate as a result of the
wrongdoing of two of their number. See infra Part V.
134. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 419.
135. See id. at 423-25.
136. See id. at 419-21.
137. Id. at 427.
138. See id. at 425-26.
139. See id. at 425-27.
140. See id. at 427.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 426 (quoting Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1948)).
143. Id. at 427; Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 560-61.
144. Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 418, 421, 423.
145. See id.
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of constructive trust. 146 By elimination, and by the Court's language, the
constructive trust in Kinsel is best explained as a judicial remedy granted
upon proof of the substantive cause of action to prevent unjust enrichment. 147
V. THE FUNCTION OF WRONGDOING

A. Altering Statutory Outcomes
In his treatise, Professor Dobbs notes that the courts of equity created
the constructive trust to remedy a breach of trust, but he concludes that this
remedy no longer requires a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 14 8
Professor Dobbs argues that a constructive trust "is appropriate in any kind
of unjust enrichment case and is in no way limited to cases of wrongdoing."l4 9
Limiting the remedy to violations of fiduciary duty or fraud is illogical, he
argues, because a "constructive trust is based on property, not wrongs." 5 o
Professor Dobbs also recognizes an exception.151 This exception applies
in cases in which a "court cannot find unjust enrichment at all unless there is
wrongdoing."15 2 For example, he discusses the Statute of Frauds, which
requires an agreement to convey land to be in writing. 153 If innocent parties
orally agree to a sale of land not knowing of this requirement, granting a
constructive trust. gives effect to an agreement the legislature declared
invalid. 15 4 On the other hand, a defendant who uses oral promises to
fraudulently induce the plaintiff to convey her land to him should not be able
to hide behind the Statute of Frauds.15 5 In this instance, a constructive trust
does not unduly endanger land titles, it prevents the manipulation of the
statutory requirements.15 6 That constructive trust also does not establish a
15
This
precedent allowing other courts leeway to disregard the statute.s
reasoning leads to the conclusion that wrongdoing is a prerequisite for
holding that enrichment conferred in part by statute is unjust.158
146. Id. at 426-27.
147. See id The Court does not fully explain its analysis on this point, but the factors it cites in
support of the constructive trust remedy best describe a general cause of action to prevent unjust
enrichment. See id "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in
restitution." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
148. See DOBBS, supranote 24, at § 4.3(2), 597. "Sometimes it is still said that the constructive trust
applies only to misdealings by fiduciaries or in cases of fraud. But this is a misconception." Id at 597.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 598.
152. Id.
153. See id at 599.
154. Id.
155. See generally id. at 597-99.
156. See generally id
157. See generally id.
158. See generally id.
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In Holmes v. Kent, the Texas Supreme Court made clear that, absent
wrongdoing, outcomes resulting from the operation of statutes cannot
unjustly enrich an unintended beneficiary. 15 9 In Holmes, Kent, the son of
Mrs. McWhorter and executor of her estate, sued to obtain a constructive
trust on the right to her retirement benefits held by the deceased's
ex-husband.16 0 Prior to her retirement as a teacher, McWhorter chose to have
her retirement benefits paid through an optional annuity plan.16 1 When she
retired, McWhorter received reduced annuity benefits so that her
62
then-husband, Holmes, would receive annuity benefits after her death.1
63
These benefits would continue during the remainder of his life.1
During the process of dissolving her marriage to Holmes, McWhorter
attempted to substitute Kent and her daughter-in-law as joint beneficiaries of
the optional annuity in place of Holmes.1 64 This attempt ran afoul of statutory
requirements for changing a beneficiary. 16 5 Under those requirements, she
could only substitute one person-not two-and she was required to submit
the proper form with either her husband's notarized consent or with a
66
certified copy of an order of the court with jurisdiction over her marriage.1
She subsequently obtained a divorce from Holmes and submitted her
decree to the Teacher Retirement System (TRS).1 6 7 That decree included
language divesting him of any rights to her retirement benefits.'1 6 The TRS
notified her that, because the decree did not explicitly order a change or
169
revocation of the named optional annuity beneficiary, it was not effective.
TRS did, however, supply her with the language that, if included in the
decree, would suffice. 170 However, McWhorter never altered the decree and
never obtained Holmes' notarized consent to a change of his beneficiary
status.' 7 1 That status, therefore, existed when she died.17 2
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
Holmes and remanded with instructions to grant Kent a constructive trust if
the trial court found McWhorter had intended to divest Holmes of those
benefits.1 7 3 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Holmes v. Kent, 221 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
See id at 623.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 626.
See id.
See id
Id.
See id
See id. at 627.
See id.
See id
See id.
Id. at 623.
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Holmes.17 4 It held that McWhorter's failure to abide by the statutory
requirements prevented courts from enforcing her intent."' The Court
declared that it did not "think a designated beneficiary wrong or unjustly
enriched to receive what the retiree gave him and never took back." 1 76
Kent could not use a constructive trust to excuse his mother's
noncompliance without undermining the relevant statutes. 17 7 In Holmes,
McWhorter's own delay or negligence left the ex-husband with benefits she
clearly intended to withdraw. 1 78 The Court held that she could have enforced
her intent in this regard by action in accordance with the statute, but she failed
to do so. 179 As a result of her failure, she allowed the relevant statutes to
enrich Holmes. 8 0 Because this enrichment occurred as a result of statutory
directives, however, it could not be unjust.181 Having no wrongdoing to cure,
judicial intervention based solely on a court's general notions of equity would
disrupt legislative requirements and policies.18 2
B. Breach of Trust or Fraud
In Statute-of-Frauds cases, the Texas Supreme Court has allowed a
constructive trust to enforce otherwise invalid oral promises so long as the
plaintiffs reliance was based on breach of trust or fraud.' 83 Needing some
wrongdoing to justify the plaintiffs credulity, the most obvious would be
deceit. 184 These forms of wrongdoing were used because of the need to
justify the plaintiffs reliance on oral promises. They were not intended to
be universal conditions for a constructive trust.185

Id. at 629.
Id at 628.
Id. at 629.
See id.
To impose a constructive trust on optional annuity payments to a designated beneficiary in
this situation, we must first attempt to ascertain if that is what the retiree really wanted, then
effectively alter the statutory scheme for benefits provided when a beneficiary has been
changed, and finally open TRS's retirement system to similar claims by others. We see
nothing equitable or just in this.
Id. at 628-29.
178. See id.
179. Id. "McWhorter never took any ofthe relatively simple steps TRS explained to change or revoke
the beneficiary designation . . . ." Id. at 628.
180. See generally id.
181. See id.
182. See id
183. See Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex. 1974). In this opinion, the Court
characterized those cases in which a constructive trust was subject to "stringent prerequisites" as those
enforcing an oral contract to convey land in conflict with the Statute of Frauds. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. The Texas Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation in Kinsel. See Kinsel v.
Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 421 (Tex. 2017).
174.
175.
176.
177.
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One begins by recognizing that a court cannot give effect to an otherwise
invalid oral contract merely because the plaintiff was careless.'" Because
benefits received as a result of the intended operation of a statute do not alone
constitute unjust enrichment,' 8 7 the refusal to carry out one's unenforceable
promise would not justify its enforcement.' 8 8 Furthermore, the operation of
the statute cannot be ignored because of an uncalled-for reliance on another
party.189 On the other hand, if the plaintiff relied on such promises because
they were made by a fiduciary or through fraud, reversing the effects of such
conduct calls for the use of a constructive trust. 190
In Faville v. Robinson, a daughter conveyed land to her mother based
on the mother's oral promise to re-convey that property by devise in her
will. 191 The mother subsequently repudiated that promise, and the daughter
sued seeking to have a trust impressed on the land. 192 The Texas Supreme
Court held that the Statute of Frauds did not apply because breach of such a
promise was "necessarily a fraud."193 Although Texas law did not at this time
require express trusts affecting land to be in writing, the Court imposed a
"parol trust" rather than a trust intended by the parties.1 94 Because the
grantee's promise induced the conveyance, she could not be allowed to keep
the benefit gained by her breach of good faith.' 95 An early commentator
noted that this use of a constructive trust does not violate the Statute of Frauds

186. See Holmes, 221 S.W.3d at 628.
187. See id. at 629.
188. See Morrison v. Farmer, 213 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1948). In this case, the respondent paid for a
house based on the petitioner's oral agreement to put it on a lot he would purchase. Id. at 814. He promised
that, after refurbishing the house, he would sell the house and lot to her for an agreed-upon price. Id.
Conflict arose concerning the price, and the petitioner refused to convey. Id The Court held that this was
either an agreement for the sale of real estate or an agreement for the petitioner to hold the land in trust.
Id at 814-15. Neither could be enforced because they violated the Statute of Frauds. See id The Court
approved the court of civil appeals' rejection of a constructive trust because "the record contain[ed] no
proof of misrepresentation, fraud or concealment to support" that remedy. Id.
189. See id. "[T]he fact that one businessman trusts another, and relies upon his promise to carry out
a[n oral] contract, does not create a constructive trust." Tyra v. Woodson, 495 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex.
1973). The Court has refused, in the absence of either a breach of fiduciary duty or fraud, to use a
constructive trust as a remedy for those who failed to read the terms of a deed before signing it. See
Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. 1962).
190. See Ginther v. Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984). In Ginther v. Taub, the defendant's
refusal to perform his oral promise to re-convey mineral interests was also tainted by the breach of a
fiduciary relationship by another party who had induced the conveyance. See id.
191. See Faville v. Robinson, 227 S.W. 938 (Tex. 1921).
192. See id.
193. See id. The Court did not require proof that the mother never intended to perform her promise.
Id. In other words, the Court did not require proof of fraudulent inducement. See id.
194. Even after Texas law required express trusts affecting land to be in writing, the Faville rule
allowed use of a constructive trust to enforce such oral promises. See Gray v. Mills, 206 S.W.2d 278,
281-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947), affd, 210 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. 1948).
195. See id.
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because it returns the land to the grantor as a means not of specific
performance but to restore the status quo.1 9 6
The Texas Supreme Court supplemented this fraud explanation by
describing a similar situation in Mills v. Gray as a breach of a confidential
relationship.' 97 In Mills, a married couple contemplating divorce conveyed
land without written restriction to the wife's son. 19 8 She contended that her
son had orally agreed to re-convey this property after the marital problems
were resolved.' 99 When the son refused to re-convey, the reconciled couple
sought a constructive trust. 20 0 However, the trial court excluded evidence of
the oral agreement between the mother and son. 201
This case arose after the legislature amended the Texas Trust Act to
require a writing for express trusts concerning title to land.202 But the Texas
Supreme Court held that this statute did not bar a constructive trust if the oral
trust agreement was made by parties in a confidential relationship.2 03 The
Court reversed the trial court's exclusion of evidence concerning the oral
agreement and noted that, if "a constructive trust would have arisen by reason
of the confidential relation between the parties," it would not violate the
Statute of Frauds or the Texas Trust Act. 2 04
The significance of a confidential family relationship established by
Mills provides an explanation of the decision in Faville v. Robinson.205 In
Faville, the Court appeared to find fraud without evidence of an intentional
misrepresentation.206 The Court in Mills noted, however, that a confidential
relationship can arise between a mother and a son (or a mother and a
daughter, as in Faville20 7 ), and its breach would be a "constructive fraud" that
would give rise to a constructive trust.208
In Fitz-Gerald v. Hill, the defendant objected to a constructive trust by
arguing that no fiduciary relationship existed between parties doing business
with mineral interests. 2 09 The majority responded by finding that the
pleadings and proof established a joint adventure among the parties, which

196. See James Barr Ames, Constructive Trusts Based upon the Breach ofan Express Oral Trust of
Land, 20 HARv. L. REv. 549, 551 (1907).
197. See Mills v. Gray, 210 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. 1948).
198. Id. at 986.
199. See id at 986-87.
200. See id
201. See id at 987.
202. See id. The 1943 amendment to the Texas Trust Act imposed a Statute of Frauds to prevent the
oral trusts that relate to real property. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.004 (West 2014).
203. See Mills, 210 S.W.2d. at 988-89.
204. Id. at 989.
205. See id
206. See Faville v. Robinson, 227 S.W. 938, 938 (Tex. 1921).
207. See id.
208. See Mills, 210 S.W.2d at 988-89 (quoting G.G. Clark, Annotation, Grantee's Oral Promise to
Grantor as Giving Rise to Trust, 159 A.L.R. 997 (1946)).
209. See Fitz-Gerald v. Hill, 237 S.W.2d 256, 261 (Tex. 1951).
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imposed on each the highest duty to the others. 2 10 Having violated his duty,
equity applied to force the defendant to "disgorge and to divide his gains" in
accordance with the oral agreement.211
Justice Smedley, in dissent, contended that a fiduciary relationship does
not arise from an oral agreement to enter a joint venture.212 It arises instead
from a preexisting relationship of confidence that was not present in this
case. 2 13 Therefore, he concluded, this constructive trust nullified the Texas
Trust Act's requirement of a written instrument for express trusts in land and
subjected "land titles to attack and change by unaided testimony to an oral
agreement ... ."214 He reasoned that the Texas Trust Act's Statute of Frauds
allows a constructive trust in only three instances: (1) a case for restitution,
(2) a case with proof of fraud, or (3) a case with proof of a violation of an
existing fiduciary relationship. 215 The exception for restitution, he noted,
applied only when the defendant had acquired property from the plaintiff and
would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain it.2 16 The plaintiffs in
Fitz-Geraldsought property they never paid for or owned and therefore were
not seeking restitution.2 17 He also concluded that evidence of a defendant's
breach of an oral promise did not establish fraud.2 18
The Texas Supreme Court in ConsolidatedGas & Equipment Co. of
2 19
America v. Thompson seemed to retreat from its ruling in Fitz-Gerald.
In
Consolidated Gas, the Court held that proof of a defendant's oral agreement
to convey a one-sixteenth overriding royalty to the plaintiffs was invalid
under either the Statute of Frauds or the Texas Trust Act. 2 20 The jury found
the plaintiffs were induced to obtain a lease and to assign it to the defendant
by his promise to give them the overriding royalty. 2 2 1 Thereafter, he refused
to perform.22 2 The Court nevertheless reversed the lower courts' constructive
trust on the assigned lease.223 Unlike the facts in Faville or Mills, these
parties were businessmen who had no familial or other confidential

210. See id at 264.
211. See id
212. Id. at 269-70 (Smedley, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 272-73 (Smedley, J., dissenting).
214. See id at 273 (Smedley, J., dissenting).
215. See id at 271 (Smedley, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 270 (Smedley, J., dissenting). This exception refers to the general acceptance of an
unjust-enrichment claim in the absence of statutory directives. Id (citing 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT,
SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 462.1 (1939)).
217. Id. (Smedley, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 271 (Smedley, J., dissenting).
219. See Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. 1966);
Fitz-Gerald, 237 S.W.2d at 265.
220. ConsolidatedGas, 405 S.W.2d at 337.
221. Id.at336.
222. See id.
223. Id at 337.
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relationship with one another prior to the oral agreement.224
explained its holding in the following manner:

467
The Court

Our holdings above cited are to the effect that for a constructive trust to
arise there must be a fiduciary relationship before, and apart from, the
agreement made the basis of the suit. Such is our holding here. As stated,
the fact that one businessman trusts another, and relies upon his promise to
carry out a contract, does not create a constructive trust. To hold otherwise
would render the Statute of Frauds meaningless. 225
In Tyra v. Woodson, the Court more directly questioned its holding in
226
Fitz-Gerald.
In Tyra, the parties orally agreed to enter a joint venture to
acquire oil and gas interests.227 The plaintiffs had requested a written
agreement, but the defendants refused to enter one. 2 28 The Texas Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's finding that no "separate fiduciary relationship"
existed prior to the oral agreement to enter ajoint venture to share oil and gas
interests. 2 29 It therefore followed from its decision in ConsolidatedGas that,
absent any fiduciary relationship, enforcement of the oral agreement through
a constructive trust would violate the Statute of Frauds.230
In Gintherv. Taub, the Court explained its holding by stating that, "[w]e
recognize that the Statute of Frauds prohibits title to real property interests
from resting in parol. However, a constructive trust based on a prior
confidential relationship and unfair conduct or unjust enrichment escapes this
rule." 231 The constructive trust imposed on Taub's mineral interest was
arguably justified by both a breach of trust and fraud. Taub had acquired
mineral interests because of the fraudulent oral representations of
MacNaughton, who purported, to act as the plaintiffs' attorney.2 32 Taub
knowingly benefitted from this breach of an attorney's fiduciary obligations
and from the attorney's fraud.233 The Court held that, "[T]he jury findings of
fraud by MacNaughton to benefit Taub support the imposition of the
constructive trust remedy" against Taub.234

224. See id. at 334-36; Mills v. Gray, 210 S.W.2d 985, 986-87 (Tex. 1948); Faville v. Robinson, 227
S.W. 938 (Tex. 1921).
225. See ConsolidatedGas, 405 S.W.2d at 336.
226. See Tyra v. Woodson, 495 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. 1973); Fitz-Gerald v. Hill, 237 S.W.2d 256,
265 (Tex. 1951).
227. See Tyra, 495 S.W.2d at 213.
228. See id In rejecting the request for a writing, one of the defendants said that no one should do
business with anyone who could not be trusted. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See Ginther v. Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984).
232. See id. at 725.
233. See id. at 727.
234. Id.
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Taub contended that he was an innocent beneficiary and had not
participated in MacNaughton's wrongdoing.235 The Court responded that the
"policy against unjust enrichment mandates that Taub not be allowed to
retain the property he received as the beneficiary of MacNaughton' s
fraud." 2 3 6 The Court went on to note that in Pope v. Garrett it "imposed a
constructive trust on totally innocent beneficiaries of the wrongful act." 237
Taub, who knew he had obtained a benefit because of MacNaughton's
misrepresentations, deserved no better treatment than a wholly innocent
beneficiary of wrongdoing.2 38
C. Violent Conduct
In its 1984 discussion of the Pope decision in Ginther, the Court placed
no emphasis on the absence of a breach of trust or fraud in that 1948
decision.23 9 And as noted above, the Pope decision was cited as authority for
the Court's recent refusal to restrict a constructive trust to these two forms of
wrongdoing. 24 0 The decision in Pope241 has special significance because in
Kinsel, the Court concluded that the constructive trust in that earlier decision
was not based on a tortious-interference-with-inheritance cause of action.242
In addition, the Court held that a constructive trust is a remedy for recovering
benefits obtained as a result of violent conduct.243
This first point opens the door for the argument that the constructive
trust in Pope remedied what was necessarily a claim for specific restitution
to prevent unjust enrichment. 24 The Texas Supreme Court in Kinsel rejected
the Kinsels' argument that the cause of action for tortious interference with
inheritance supported liability in Pope.2 45 This ruling seemingly leaves only
an unjust-enrichment cause of action supporting that constructive trust. 2 46
235. Id.
236. Id. at 728 (citing Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948)).
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. See id. The Court also cites Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex. 1974), for the
proposition that "constructive trusts, being remedial in character, have the very broad function of
redressing wrong or unjust enrichment." Id.
240. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d411, 426 (Tex. 2017).
241. See Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 562.
242. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 425.
243. See generally id In Kinsel, the Court made clear that in Pope, "[tihere was no need to establish
a 'special trust or fiduciary relationship' between the intended beneficiary and the heirs-at-law or establish
that the heirs-at-law defrauded the decedent." See id at 426.
244. See id at 423-26; Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 562. "The policy against unjust enrichment argues in
favor of the judgment" of the district court, which extended Garrett's constructive trust to all of the assets
in the estate. Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 562.
245. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 423.
246. See id. "The case [against the participating heirs] is a typical one for the intervention of equity
to prevent a wrongdoer, who by his fraudulent or otherwise wrongful act has acquired title to property,
from retaining and enjoying the beneficial interest therein ..... Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 560.
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In Pope, Ms. Garrett sued to obtain a constructive trust on the assets of
the estate of her friend, Ms. Simons. 247 That estate had passed to the heirs of
Simons through the descent and distribution statute.248 Prior to her death,
Simons exhibited an unexecuted will to a gathering of witnesses and family
members, explained that the will gave her whole estate to Garrett, and
expressed her intent to execute that will.2 49 Before she could do so, however,
two of the family members present "by physical force or by creating a
disturbance, prevented her from carrying out her intention to execute the
will." 25 0 Shortly thereafter she lapsed into a coma and died without signing
the will. 251

Although the trial court gave Garrett a constructive trust on all the assets
in the estate, the court of civil appeals allowed it only on the portion held by
the participating heirs-those who prevented the will's execution. 25 2 The
court of civil appeals concluded that only this portion could be subjected to
a constructive trust.2 5 3 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this limited
remedy and upheld the trial court's constructive trust on the inheritance of
both the participating and the nonparticipating heirs. 254 The Court stated that,
"The policy against unjust enrichment argues in favor of the judgment
rendered herein by the district court [imposing the constructive trust on all
heirs] rather than that of the Court of Civil Appeals." 255 The Court also cited
with approval Dean Roscoe Pound's observation of what he called "the
typical case of constructive trust, namely, specific restitution of a received
benefit in order to prevent unjust enrichment."25 6
The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that this constructive trust did not
undermine the statute of descent and distribution because "[b]ut for the
wrongful acts[,] the innocent defendants would not have inherited interests
in the property."257 The Court recognized the danger posed by this remedy
and noted that it must be used with caution so that it does not "defeat the
purposes of the statute of wills, the statute of descent and distribution, or the
[S]tatute of [F]rauds."2 58 In this instance, however, the constructive trust
could be used "in order that a statute enacted for the purpose of preventing
fraud may not be used as an instrument for perpetrating or protecting a
fraud."259
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Pope, 211 S.W.2d. at 559.
See id.
See id. at 562.
Id at 560.
Id.
See id. at 559.
Id.
See id. at 562.
Id
Id
Id.
See id.
See id. at 561.
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Unlike the constructive trust requested in Holmes, the remedy in Pope
reversed the consequences of the wrongdoing and thus did not contradict the
intended operation of the statutes.26 0 Neither the statute of wills nor the
statute of descent and distribution was designed to protect an outcome
accomplished through violence. 2 61 And it was this violence that caused the
unjust enrichment of all of the heirs.262
Although different in outcome, the Texas Supreme Court's decisions in
Holmes and Pope are two applications of the same principle.263 In Holmes,
the Court denied a constructive trust because the defendant's enrichment
resulted from the decedent's failure to comply with statutory requirements.26 4
In the Pope case, Simons was in the process of executing her will in order to
leave the whole of her estate to Garrett when she was violently prevented
from doing so. 2 6 5 To highlight the principle of these decisions, assume
instead that Simons was overcome by illness at the scene and died before she
signed the will. Her own delay, coupled with her illness, would therefore
have caused her estate to pass according to the statute of descent and
distribution.26 6 In this hypothetical, even the overwhelming evidence of
Simons's intent could not prove the heirs' unjust enrichment.
Another Texas Supreme Court decision dealing with violent conduct
presents an even starker inconsistency with the first element of the rule. 267 in
Bounds v. Caudle, the jury in the civil case found that the decedent's husband,
who was the primary beneficiary under her will and life insurance policy, had
"intentionally and wrongfully caused" her death.2 68 Although the Court
reversed the lower courts for other reasons, it concluded that Texas law
supports a constructive trust on property that passes by will or inheritance to
a beneficiary who wrongfully kills the deceased.26 9
Statutory forfeiture of the life insurance proceeds was also authorized
by what is now § 201.058 of the Texas Estates Code, if the husband had been
convicted and sentenced for willfully killing the insured.2 70 However, the
husband entered a plea bargain in his criminal case and was allowed to plead

260. Compare Holmes v. Kent, 221 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that a son could
not use a constructive trust to excuse his mother's lack of enforced intent without undermining the
statutes), with Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 559 (holding that imposing a constructive trust on all heirs followed
the policy against unjust enrichment).
261. See Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 559.
262. See id. at 562.
263. See Holmes, 221 S.W.3d at 628-29; Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 561-62.
264. See Holmes, 221 S.W.3d at 623.
265. See Pope, 211 S.W.2d at 559-60.
266. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201 (West 2017).
267. See generally Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 928; see also Thompson v. Mayes, 707 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tex. App.-Eastand 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).

270. See EST. CODE. § 201.058; see also Bounds, 560 S.W.2d at 925. This provision excuses this
forfeiture from the constitutional and statutory bars on convictions that "work corruption of blood." Id.
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nolo contendere to a charge of negligent homicide.2 7 1 The Court held that,
based on the civil jury's finding, the "common law constructive trust" could
be impressed on property transferred by the wife's will without being
inconsistent with that statute or its requirements.27 2
Powerful equitable, moral, and policy reasons justify using a
constructive trust to implement the slayer rule.273 It prevents the unjust
enrichment of a killer who would otherwise benefit under the will. 2 74 Under
traditional analysis, the slayer takes legal title through the probate of a valid
will, but holds that title subject to a constructive trust for the one who has
superior equitable title.275 The constructive trust thereby prevents what
would otherwise be the unjust enrichment of the slayer.276
VI. INNOCENT BUT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED

The decisions discussed in Part V show why a finding of unjust
enrichment requires wrongdoing when a statutory directive applies. In the
following cases, the Texas Supreme Court and one court of appeals approved
a constructive trust without regard to the defendant's wrongful acquisition of
the property.2 77 These decisions thus impliedly reject a universal requirement
of wrongdoing for a constructive trust.2 78
The constructive trust is a remedy that provides specific restitutionthat is, it returns property to its rightful owner. 27 9 The issue addressed here
is whether Texas law affirmatively supports this form of restitution in the
absence of wrongdoing. 2 8 0 For example, does Texas law allow a constructive
271. See Bounds, 560 S.W.2d at 926.
272. See id. at 928. The Court calls this equitable remedy a "common law constructive trust" but this
was a reference to its judicial, as opposed to statutory, authority and not to the historical origins of the
remedy. See id.
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION ANE) UNJUST ENRICHMENT
INST. 2011).

§ 45

cmt. c (AM. LAW

274. See generally id
275. See Bounds, 560 S.W.2d at 928 ("The trust is a creature of equity and does not contravene
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against forfeiture because title to the property does actually pass
to the killer. The trust operates to transfer the equitable title to the trust beneficiaries."). The Court was
referring to Article I, § 21, of the Texas Constitution and, more particularly, to § 4 1(d) of the Probate Code
(now § 201.058 of the Texas Estates Code), which provided that, "[n]o conviction shall work corruption
of blood or forfeiture of estate except [in the case of a beneficiary in].a life insurance policy or contract
who is convicted and sentenced" as a slayer of the insured. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.058 (West 2017).
276. See Bounds, 560 S.W.2d at 928. The heirs also could prevent unjust enrichment by obtaining a
monetary award, but this remedy would at least temporarily leave the victim's estate in the hands of her
slayer for possible disposal, waste, or hiding. See id
277.

See Angus S. McSwain, Jr., Limitations Statutes and the Constructive Trust in Texas, 41

BAYLOR L. REV. 429 (1989) (listing the various uses of a constructive trust by Texas courts including
cases not dependent on wrongdoing).
278. See supra Part V (showing that wrongdoing is not essential for implementation of a constructive
trust).

.279.
280.

See, e.g., McSwain, supra note 277 (discussing constructive trusts in Texas).
See generally id
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trust to recover property acquired because of mistaken payments by the
plaintiff? In such cases, the plaintiff makes the mistake that enriches a
defendant who is innocent of wrongdoing. Can the plaintiff in this instance
recover the mistaken payment through restitution? Furthermore, can the
plaintiff use a constructive trust for this purpose? That would undoubtedly
be the case if Texas courts did not recite the three-element rule as a condition
for that remedy.281
Texas law indisputably allows a monetary award as general restitution
to prevent unjust enrichment caused by mistaken payments.2 82 In
Bryan v. Citizens National Bank,283 the Texas Supreme Court expressly
recognized this remedy and stated that,
a party who pays funds under a mistake of fact may recover restitution of
those funds if the party to whom payment was made has not materially
changed his position in reliance thereon. The purpose of such restitution is
to prevent unconscionable loss to the party paying out the funds and unjust
enrichment to the party receiving the payment. 284
In that case, Citizens National Bank mistakenly paid a check over a stop
payment order.28 5 It sued seeking return of these funds through a monetary
award.286 The judgment for general restitution was reversed, however, and
the Court remanded the case for trial on the issue of whether the drawer of
the check was liable to the payee.287 The Court held that, though the law had
been unclear, the bank retained its cause of action to seek restitution. 2 88 it
could not, however, recover on that cause of action in a manner that conflicts
with applicable Uniform Commercial Code sections.2 89 In Bryan, therefore,
the cause of action depended on proof that. the payor on the check had a
defense, which would support a claim that the payee was unjustly enriched
by the mistaken payment. 29
No obvious reason or policy justifies restricting this cause of action in a
manner that prevents recovery of identifiable property acquired by use of a
mistaken payment. 291 As the cases discussed below strongly indicate, the

281. See supra Part IV (discussing the three-element rule).
282. See generally Bryan v. Citizens Nat'1 Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982).
283. See id.
284. Id. at 763 (citations omitted).
285. See id. at 761.
286. See id at 762.
287. See id at 764.
288. Id.
289. See id
290. See id
291. A modem version of the law of unjust enrichment involves two central propositions, "first, that
the common law incorporates a broad principle of liability based on unjust enrichment . . . second, that
some characteristic remedial devices in equity (notably constructive trust) are likewise directed at the

prevention of unjust enrichment, and should therefore be understood as alternative means to the same
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Court is very likely to support a constructive trust for recovery of mistaken
payments.29 2 It has, in fact, expressly stated its approval of that result in the
Zundell case. 293
It should be noted, however, that an innocent recipient of mistaken
payments has defenses that are not available against claims based on
wrongdoing.29 4 For example, the Court notes in Bryan that a defendant
without knowledge of the mistake may have materially changed position
based on the mistaken payment.295 Satisfaction of that defense, or of others,
can defeat the plaintiffs unjust-enrichment claim and thereby prevent
restitution of any sort.296 In addition, a claim of unjust enrichment for
mistaken payments cannot exist when in conflict with the terms of a valid
and enforceable contract.2 97
In the introduction of this Article, a hypothetical was described in which
a misdirected online transfer was traced to identifiable property. 29 8 This
hypothetical is drawn from the decision by the San Antonio Court of Appeals
in Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank..299 In that case, Ms. Gonzales's troubles
began when she asked her secretary to wire transfer $152,604 to her Wells
Fargo account in San Antonio.30 0 This automated computer transaction was
completed solely by use of an account number.301 Unfortunately, the
secretary accidentally altered two numbers of that Wells Fargo account, and
the money was thus mistakenly credited to the San Antonio Wells Fargo
account of Mr. Castano, a stranger.302

ends." Andrew Kull, James Barr and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 297, 302-03 (2005).
292 See, e.g, Zundell v. Gess, 10 S.W. 693, 694 (Tex. 1889).
293. See id.
294. See Bryan, 628 S.W.2d at 761.
295. See id
296. See id at 767. Equitable reasons can justify retention of property obtained at the plaintiffs
expense. See generally id. The recipient of a mistaken payment can retain that property because it
extended valuable services in reliance on the mistaken payment, see Holden Bus. Forms Co. v. Columbia
Med. Ctr. of Arlington, 83 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); because he has
changed his position due to the plaintiffs mistake, see Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Rittman, 790
S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ); or because the plaintiff is deemed a
"volunteer", see RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(3) (AM. LAW
INST. 2011). These defenses defeat the plaintiffs equitable rights by providing justification for the
benefits obtained by the defendant, who is therefore not unjustly enriched.
297. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 966 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. 1998). The power
company had entered a long-term contract with the railroad for the transportation of coal. Id. The railroad
began making unforeseen profits because of the reduction of its costs, and the contract contained a
provision for adjusting payments. Id. The jury found that this provision was not violated but that the
railroad was nevertheless unjustly enriched. Id. The Court noted that the jury's finding of compliance
with the contract foreclosed its finding of unjust enrichment. See id. at 469-70.
298. See supra Part I (laying out two cases to consider in light of this Article).
299. See Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank, 82 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
300. Id. at 41.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 42.
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After discussing this unexplained deposit with bank officials, Castano
withdrew the $152,604, as well as his own $2,000, as cashier's checks, and
agreed with bank officials to place the larger check in a safety deposit box
until the matter was cleared up. 30 3 About this time, Gonzales asked her
secretary to transfer another $50,585 to her San Antonio account, but the
secretary used the same altered account number and forwarded this sum as
well to Castano's bank account.3 04 A few days later, Castano withdrew this
money as another cashier's check and placed it in his safety deposit box. 305
After Gonzales discovered the mistaken transfers, she notified Wells
Fargo.306 The bank's officials sought return of the two cashier's checks that
represented Gonzales's money, but Castano refused to return them. 307 At that
point, Gonzales sued Wells Fargo, which then interpleaded Castano. 30 s The
trial court ordered Castano to return the two cashier's checks, representing
Gonzales's $203,189, to Wells Fargo, and ordered the bank to cancel the
checks and deposit the money in Gonzales's account. 3 09 The order applied
only to these two specific items of property held by Castano-the two
cashier's checks-that were the traceable product of Gonzales's mistaken
transfers.31 o
Upon appeal by Castano, the San Antonio Court of Appeals noted that
the trial court's order was a constructive trust and that such remedies "have
the broad function of redressing wrong or unjust enrichment .

...

."11 The

court seemed to contradict this statement by noting that a "constructive trust
can arise when there is a fiduciary relationship, a promise, a transfer of
property with reliance on the promise, and unjust enrichment." 3 12 However,
the court held that a fiduciary relationship did exist because "Castano agreed
to hold the funds in trust until the matter was 'cleared up."' 3 13 Castano did
in fact agree to hold the money in his safety deposit box pending an
explanation of the windfall, but he entered this agreement after he had
received the money. 3 14 He clearly did not, as the three-element rule requires,
wrongfully acquire the money because of a breach of trust or fraud.315

303. Id.
304. Id
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id
310. See id.
311. Id. at 43 (citing Ginther v. Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984)) (emphasis added).
312. Id. (emphasis added). This statement appears to describe the first two elements of the
three-element rule. See id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 42
315. See generally id.
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Even as an innocent recipient, however, Castano had no right to the
property.3 16 He also had no defense to the contention that he would be
unjustly enriched if allowed to retain Gonzales's money. 17 In addition, it
was indisputable that the cashier's checks were the product of Gonzales's
mistaken transfer. 3 18 The plaintiffs thereby satisfied the unjust-enrichment
and the tracing requirements, and the absence of wrongdoing was simply

irrelevant.3 1 9
Even though the facts did not satisfy the three-element rule, the court of
appeals was undoubtedly correct in upholding the constructive trust.32 0
Consider for a moment the alternative. If strict application of the
three-element rule barred this constructive trust, Gonzales and Wells Fargo
could presumably obtain general restitution through a monetary award.
While Castano retained control over property that clearly belonged to
Gonzales, the plaintiffs would have the burden of enforcing that judgment
against his nonexempt assets. 3 2 1 During a suit in trial court for a monetary
award, Texas law bars any provisional injunctive relief to freeze a
defendant's assets.32 2 Therefore, if denied equitable relief, the plaintiffs
could not use a temporary injunction to freeze the cashier's checks.323
Castano would thereby have such leverage that he could obtain a settlement
allowing him to keep part of Gonzales's money. 3 24 The trial court and court
of appeals avoided the injustice of such an alternative by imposing the
constructive trust. 325

In this day of online banking and payment systems, many residents of
the state could be a keyboard click away from Gonzales's problem. Financial
affairs could therefore become more dangerous if these mistakes could not
be corrected by our most efficient judicial remedy. The San Antonio Court
of Appeals avoided the three-element rule's barrier and reached the correct
316. See id. at 43.
317. See id. Texas law clearly supported recovery of a monetary award under these facts. See Bryan
v. Citizens Nat'1 Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1982) (permitting a party to recover restitution of funds
paid under a mistake of fact). The only question was whether Gonzales could obtain a constructive trust
instead of a money judgment. See Castano, 82 S.W.3d at 42.
318. See id.
319. See generally id.
320. See id. at 43.
321. See generally id. Although these facts were not discussed in the case, Castano may not have
possessed $200,000 in readily available nonexempt assets when the judgment was finalized. The cashier's
checks seem to provide a sufficient target, but they might not have been available when a final monetary
award was issued.

322. See Nowak v. Los Patios Inv'rs, Ltd., 898 S.W.2d 9, 10 n.2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no
writ) (listing cases in which the court had discretion to issue a preliminary injunction as to assets subject
to equitable remedies). Neither a Texas nor a federal court will issue provisional injunctive orders to
protect the enforcement of a common-law claim for damages, but in both court systems, however, a trial
court can do so when the final remedy is primarily equitable, such as a constructive trust. See generally
id.
323. See Castano, 82 S.W.3d at 43.
324. See id.
325. See id.
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result, but the law should not require ingenious circumvention of announced
rules of law in order to protect property rights.
Although Castano was not decided by the Texas Supreme Court, the
Court has expressed support for this use of a constructive trust.326 Well over
a century ago in Zundell v. Gess, the Texas Supreme Court stated its approval
of a constructive trust remedy and of specific restitution for return of
mistaken payments. 327 In Zundell, the Court considered a Swiss bank's
request for a constructive trust on the defendant's land to obtain money it had
erroneously paid him.328 In discussing this remedy, the Court stated:
It may be conceded that "whenever one party has obtained money which
does not equitably belong to him, and which he cannot in good conscience
retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it," a
constructive trust will arise, whether the money came to the possession of
such person by accident, mistake offact, orfraud.... To enforce this trust,
the money must be identified, or it must be clearly traced into property
purchased with it. If this be done, it is the right of the beneficiary to have
the money or property bought with it, and this right he may enforce against
the trustee, or any one holding under him, who is not an innocent
purchaser. 329

The bank had erroneously reduced Swiss francs owed to Gess to dollars and
forwarded to him $1,073 instead of the correct amount, which was $389.330
Gess allegedly used that money and other funds to purchase the home upon
which the bank sought to impose a constructive trust. 3 3 1 The Texas Supreme
Court held that the bank had failed to satisfy its burden of tracing the money
to this land.332 Because of this failure, it could not enjoy the remedy of a
constructive trust on Gess's land.333 Had the bank satisfied this obligation, it
presumably could have obtained a constructive trust even though its own
4
mistake caused Gess's unearned benefit. 33

Without requiring wrongdoing, the Court has also approved the
constructive trust as a remedy for enforcing contractual wills. 335 A court
typically impresses this constructive trust on some part of the decedent's
estate as probated under the breaching will. 33 6 In Wiemers v. Wiemers,
326. See Zundell v. Gess, 10 S.W. 693, 694 (Tex. 1889).
327. See id.
328. See id at 693.
329. Id at 694 (emphasis added).
330. Id. at 693.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 695.
333. See id.
334. See id. at 694.
335. See Wiemers v. Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1984); Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848,
853 (Tex. 1980).
336. See Coffman v. Woods, 696 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Novak, 596 S.W.2d at 853.

2018]

THE TEXAS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

477

George and Ida Wiemers executed a joint will in 1951 that would ultimately
devise their 125-acre homestead to their son Wesley.337 George died in 1960,
and Ida probated the joint will. 3 In 1972, she executed another will that
conflicted with the 1951 will. 33 9 Upon her death, the beneficiaries probated
the 1972 will, but Wesley's wife and children sued for a constructive trust on
the homestead. 34 0 The Court held the 1951 will was a contractual will and
that Wesley's wife and children could, therefore, obtain a constructive trust
on the property devised to him in the will. 341
One might argue that Ida's 1972 will represented a breach of trust, but
the Texas Supreme Court did not rely on, or even discuss, such
wrongdoing. 342 Furthermore, the Court did not conclude that Ida was guilty
of fraud.343 Instead, it granted the constructive trust to avoid unjust
enrichment. 3 " The Court concluded that, "It would be manifestly unjust to
permit the surviving party to the contract to disavow it ... after the other
party has fully performed by abiding
by it until his ability to revise [the will]
34 5
has been terminated by death."
In McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, the Court dealt with a property
settlement agreement that required a wife to convey to the husband her
interests in a twenty-two-acre tract in exchange for the husband's payment of
$22,500.346 The husband failed to pay, and the trial court imposed a vendor's
lien on the property and ordered it sold at foreclosure. 347 The Court noted
that under Texas law a property settlement in a divorce proceeding is treated
as a contract and is controlled by the law of contracts. 3" However, the Court
held that when a grantor does not reserve an express lien securing payment
of the purchase money, equity imposes a vendor's lien that can be enforced
in a suit brought for that purpose. 34 9 This vendor's lien "arose by implication,
as a natural equity creating a constructive trust in the vendee... ."350 An
equitable lien and a constructive trust are related equitable remedies in that
the equitable lien gives the plaintiff a security interest in an identifiable item
337. See Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 355.
338. Id. at 356.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 356-57.
341. See id Unlike the will in Wiemers, a valid contract in a will executed after September 1, 1979,
must state that a contract exists and include its material provisions. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 254.004(a)(2) (West 2017).
342. See Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 356-57. Ida, now deceased, was not being sued for breach of
contract, and the remedy of specific performance was not appropriate. See id.
343. See id; Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 853 (Tex. 1980).
344. See Wiemers, 683 S.W.2d at 357.
345. Id (quoting Weidner v. Crowther, 301 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. 1957)).
346. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1984).
347. See id.
348. See id. at 882.
349. Id.
350. Id (quoting White, Smith & Baldwin v. Downs, 40 Tex. 225, 231 (1874)); see Magallanez v.
Magallanez, 911 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
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of the defendant's property while a constructive trust orders that property's
transfer.35 1
In another family law decision, the Texas Supreme Court granted a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus to an ex-husband who had been confined
for failure to comply with the trial court's order to pay real property taxes on
the marital residence.35 2 The Court held this confinement for a debt was in
violation of the Texas Constitution, and he therefore could not be
incarcerated for contempt of court.353 However, the Court distinguished this
order to pay back taxes out of unidentified funds from a contempt order for
failure to turn over community property.35 4
We have held that when a trial court finds that the particular property at
issue currently exists and awards that property as part of the community
estate's division, the contemnor is not indebted to the other party, but
becomes a constructive trustee who holds that party's assets .... In this
case, the Henrys' divorce decree did not indicate that funds to pay the
property taxes presently existed ....
The Court also noted that a constructive trust could be used to enforce a
divorce court's order to turn over funds so long as that property was in
existence and was identified.356
During the 1940s, the Texas Supreme Court decided two cases in which
an owner of the surface estate of land defaulted on a note secured by both the
surface and mineral estates. 357 In both cases, the defaulting owner later
acquired the surface and mineral estate of the property free of the preexisting
mineral interests.3 5 8 In Cecil v. Dollar,Cecil executed a deed of trust binding
a 640-acre tract of land to secure a note owed to Newman. 359 A year later,
Cecil conveyed the land to Blount in a deed that reserved one-half of the
36 1
mineral interest. 360 Blount also assumed payment of the Newman note.
Thereafter, Blount conveyed the land to Dollar, less Cecil's reserved one-half

351. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
INST. 2011).

§ 56 cmt.

b (AM. LAW

352. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 595 (Tex. 2005).
353. See id.at 597.
354. See id.
355. Id. (citing Exparte Preston, 347 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. 1961)). Statutory authority for such a
constructive trust was added in 1997 and can be found in Texas Family Code § 9.009. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 9.009 (West 2017).
356. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 597. The order Henry disobeyed also required payment of child
support, which was not a debt. Id at 595. However, the contempt order did not distinguish the punishment
for failure to pay child support from that imposed for failure to pay back taxes. See id. at 598.
357. See Cecil v. Dollar, 218 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1949); Talley v. Howsley, 176 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.
1943).
358. See Cecil, 218 S.W.2d at 448; Talley, 176 S.W.2d at 158.
359. See Cecil, 218 S.W.2d at 449.
360. Id.
361. Id.
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mineral interest, and Dollar assumed liability to pay the Newman note.
Subsequently, Dollar failed to pay the Newman note, which he had extended,
and then purchased the land at the trustee's sale free of any reservation of
minerals.3 6 3
The facts showed that Dollar had sufficient funds to pay the Newman
note but decided to default and purchase the property at foreclosure.36 4 The
Court held that, "It would be unconscionable to allow [Dollar] to acquire the
Cecil interest and thus unjustly enrich himself." 3 6 5 The Court mentioned a
general rule barring "one cotenant, without the consent of the others, to buy
in an outstanding adversary claim to the common estate and assert it for his
exclusive benefit." 3 66 However, in explaining its decision, the Court
distinguished its earlier decision in Talley v. Howsley by observing that the
defaulting cotenant in that case, Will McKeichen, had not been shown to have
been enriched by his default. 36 7 In contrast, Dollar had intentionally
defaulted and immediately benefitted from his own default.368 This evidence
supported the conclusion that his purpose was to enrich himself unjustly at
the expense of the mineral-interest holder. 369
In Talley, Will McKeichen owned only the surface estate but had
assumed primary liability to pay off the mortgage debt to Davis, and this debt
was binding on both the surface and mineral estates.37 0 When McKeichen
defaulted, Davis foreclosed and purchased the land at foreclosure-free of
any claims to the mineral interest.371 After one year, Davis sold part of the
land without any reservation of minerals to Will McKeichen. 37 2 The Court
refused to issue a constructive trust on the mineral estate because it noted that
this remedy required a showing of fraud, which was not present in the case.373
However, the Court in Cecil based its approval of a constructive trust more
directly on the defaulting cotenant's obvious attempt to enrich himself
unjustly at the expense of his cotenants.3 74 It concluded that Dollar's
purchase at foreclosure relieved Cecil's obligation under the debt, but Dollar

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 449-50.
365. Id. at 450.
366. Id
367. See Talley v. Howsley, 176 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1943); see also Cecil, 218 S.W.2d at 451.
368. See Cecil, 218 S.W.2d at 449-50.
369. See id.
370. Talley, 176 S.W.2d at 159.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id at 160.
374. See Cecil, 218 S.W.2d at 450. The Texas Supreme Court in Cecil spoke of the rule that barred
a cotenant from acquiring an adverse claim to the common estate so as to divest his cotenants. See id.
This rule was applied, however, because Dollar used foreclosure to unjustly enrich himself at the expense
ofhis cotenants. See id.; cf Dickason v. Mathews, 335 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating the rule as a general equitable principle).
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"acquired no better equitable title than he had prior to the sale."3 75 Therefore,
even though Dollar acquired legal title to the minerals, he held that interest
as a constructive trustee for Cecil.376
In a breach of contract case, the Court also approved a constructive trust
imposed on a specific fund in a Mexican bank.377 This constructive trust
required the defendant to deposit the fund in the registry of a Texas trial
court. 378 The parties had, in Texas, agreed to jointly purchase a Mexican
lottery ticket, and it turned out to be a winner.37 9 The defendant denied the
agreement, however, and caused her son to collect the money and deposit it
in a bank in Mexico.3 80 The Texas trial court ordered the defendant to deposit
the plaintiffs portion in the registry of the court, and the Texas Supreme
Court upheld this order as well as the court of civil appeals' characterization
of that order as a constructive trust.38 1 The trial court directed its order at a
specific bank account under the defendants' control into which they had
deposited money that had been traced to money that, under the contract,
belonged to the plaintiff.3 82
The Texas Supreme Court in KCM Financialcited its earlier decision
in Meadows v. Bierschwale3 8 3 for the proposition that "[a] constructive trust
is an equitable, court-created remedy designed to prevent unjust
enrichment." 3 84 This quotation was also included in the Court's more recent
decision in Kinsel.385 In Meadows, Bierschwale hired Meadows to broker the
sale of his apartment complex, and Meadows found a buyer in Herbert
Oakes.3 86 Oakes paid for Bierschwale's apartment complex with a set of
promissory notes (the Black Hardware notes), and Bierschwale persuaded
Meadows to take some of these notes as his commission. 3 87 The notes,
however, proved to be worthless.388

375. See Cecil, 218 S.W.2d. at 451.
376. See id.
377. See Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. 1967).
378. See id
379. Id. at 425.
380. Id. at 424. This companion case held that the contract was not illegal and that the plaintiff had
ownership of half of the winnings. See id
381. Id. at 434.
382. See id at 433. Although this order was described as a constructive trust, it could have been
described as a temporary injunction. See id. An injunctive order of this sort could operate as specific
performance although the property involved was not unique. See id
383. See Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1974).
384. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2014) (citing Meadows, 516 S.W.2d at
131).
385. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 425 (Tex. 2017) (quoting KCMFin. LLC, 457 S.W.3d
at 87).

386.
387.
388.

See Meadows, 516 S.W.2d at 127.
See id at 127-28.
See id. at 128.
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In the meantime, Oakes sold the apartment complex to Goldman, a bona
fide purchaser, who also paid with promissory notes (the Goldman notes). 3 89
In his suit to rescind the sale to Oakes based on fraud, Bierschwale obtained
a constructive trust on the Goldman notes.390 This fraud placed Oakes in a
position to benefit from the Goldman notes, which were the traceable product
of the apartment complex sale.39 1 Meadows intervened in this suit seeking
both a monetary award against Oakes and a portion of Bierschwale's
constructive trust on the Goldman notes.3 92 Although it allowed Meadows a
monetary award, the court of civil appeals denied him any part of the
constructive trust obtained by Bierschwale.393
In reversing this part of the court of civil appeals' decision, the Texas
Supreme Court held that Bierschwale must proportionately share the benefits
of the constructive trust with Meadows. 394 The Court concluded that
Bierschwale could not enjoy this equitable remedy while denying Meadows
the same equity.3 95 In explaining its ruling, the Court noted that constructive
trusts "have the very broad function of redressing wrong or unjust
enrichment" and that "no unyielding formula" binds a court of equity in
"decreeing a constructive trust." 396 In reality, Bierschwale gained a
substantial profit from the Goldman notes and was further enriched by
excluding Meadows. 3 97 The Court thus used a constructive trust to prevent
the unjust enrichment of a party even though he was innocent of
wrongdoing. 398
VII. THE MISLEADING NATURE OF THE RULE

A. UnansweredQuestions
Until the Kinsel decision, the three-element rule's first element appeared
to restrict a constructive trust to the restoration of property acquired through
either a breach of trust or fraud.399 The Court's holding in Kinsel makes clear
389. See id. at 127.
390. See id. at 125.
391. See id. at 128.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 132-33.
395. Id. at 131-32.
396. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
397. See id. at 132.
398. See id. at 133. In Gintherv. Taub, the Texas Supreme Court noted that in Meadows it recognized
the broad function and remedial character of a constructive trust and how it was to be used "in keeping
with the basic principles of equity and justice." See Ginther v. Taub, 675 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. 1984).
399. The Court's statement of the rule as "generally required" in the KCMFinancialdecision prevents
one from disregarding the rule. See KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2014). The
San Antonio Court of Appeals did, however, find a way around it. See Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank, 82
S.W.3d 40, 43 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.). One might say that it circumvented the rule in a
good cause, but surely that good cause argues for an authoritative disavowal. See generally id.
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that today a broader array of wrongful conduct can justify the remedy. 400
Indeed, as noted above, the Court's past decisions establish a far broader
basis for the remedy, and one that directly conflicts with the rule. 4 01 One
concern is that the Kinsel decision does not explicitly approve a constructive
trust on property acquired without wrongdoing. 402 The Court's older
decisions support that conclusion, but the continued existence of the
three-element rule raises a problem. 403 The failure to repudiate the rule leaves
courts, lawyers, and clients trapped by an express but controversial condition
on an important remedy.404 That problem would be alleviated in part if the
Court directly changed the rule to recognize that a constructive trust has a
broad function of "redressing wrong or unjust enrichment." 40 1
B. The Superfluous Second Element
In Kinsel, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the constructive trust used
to prevent those defendants from enjoying the benefit of property acquired
through their undue influence.406 The holding thus avoided a strict reading
of the rule's first element.40 7 This constructive trust affected the funds
acquired through undue influence 4 0 8 and captured them in a specific trust
fund.409 The Court thereby upheld the constructive trust while at least
expanding the forms of wrongdoing that can support unjust enrichment.4 10
If wrongdoing in some form is always required, the three elements of
the rule do not make sense. Proof of the first (wrongful acquisition) and the
third (tracing) elements invariably establish the defendant's unjust
enrichment.4 1' Satisfaction of these elements thus makes the second element
superfluous. For example, a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
generally requires proof that the defendant's breach either caused the plaintiff
injury or conferred a benefit on the defendant.4 12 By proving the defendant
400. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2017).
401. See Ginther, 675 S.W.2d at 724.
402. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 411.
403. See Holmes v. Kent, 221 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
404. See generally id
405. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 411 (quoting Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex.
1974)).
406. See id at 426-27.
407. See id at 411.
408. See id. at 418.
409. See id The plaintiffs originally agreed to allow Jane to use trust proceeds to pay her attorney's
fees, but they subsequently sought to have her replenish those funds when they fell below the original $3
million. See id at 424.
410. See id at 411.
411. See supraPart IV (discussing the three-element rule in greater depth).
412. Graham Mortg. Corp. v. Hall, 307 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). The
elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim are: (1) a fiduciary relationship must exist between the
plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant must have breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3) the
defendant's breach must result in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant. See id.
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obtained specific property by breaching his duty, the plaintiff would satisfy
the first and the third elements of the rule. 413 That same proof will also
establish the defendant's unjust enrichment.4 14 How could allowing such a
guilty defendant to retain property belonging to the plaintiff not be unjust?
For example, the Lindseys' undue influence in Kinsel allowed them to
capture the $3 million in sales proceeds from Lesey's 60% interest in the
ranch.4 15 By using undue influence to divert Lesey's ranch interest to
themselves at the expense of the stepchildren and step grandchildren, they
were unjustly enriched.4 16 In other words, the wrongful conduct that allowed
them to acquire another's property established unjust enrichment without any
additional proof required.4 17 As a result, when proof shows that the defendant
has wrongfully acquired traceable property at the expense of the plaintiff, a
further requirement of unjust enrichment is redundant.
However, this redundancy disappears if one recognizes that wrongful
conduct is one, but not the only, way of proving unjust enrichment. As noted
above, the Restatement (Third) requires proof of only tracing and unjust
enrichment.4 18 It recognizes that the finding of unjust enrichment can be
proven either through wrongdoing or by showing the wrongfulness of the
defendant's retention of the property at issue. 4 19 Therefore, specific
restitution through a constructive trust should be available when tracing has
been proven and when unjust enrichment is shown by one of the two bases
for that conclusion--either wrongful retention or wrongful acquisition.4 20
The three-element rule's insistence on wrongdoing in every case serves no
policy or purpose and confuses the matter as well.421
C. Unjust-Enrichment Cause ofAction
In the Kinsel decision, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a strict
application of the first element of the rule because it viewed the "permissible

413. See Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533 S.W.3d 866, 875 (Tex. 2017). This
conclusion assumes the plaintiffs proof shows that the specific property was acquired as a result of the
defendant's breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
414. See id. at 873.
415. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 411.
416. See id.
417. Id.
418.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

55(1) (AM. LAW INST.

2011).
419. See id.
420. See id. at § 55(1) cmt. f.
421. It is difficult to conjure a modem policy that would not be better served by a rule that omitted
the restrictiveness of the first element. If strictly applied, the first element limits the remedial power of
courts, but such a blanket restriction serves no particular policy. Requiring wrongdoing only furthers an
important policy when that restriction on judicial power serves to protect legislative decisions.
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bases for a constructive trust too narrowly. 4 22 The Court also appeared to
recognize that a constructive trust primarily operates to prevent unjust
enrichment however proven.42 3 It indicated as much when it stated that, a
"constructive trust is an equitable, court-created remedy designed to prevent
unjust enrichment" 424 and that it returns property to "the one who is truly and
equitably entitled to the same."425 This opinion thus seems to accept much
broader equitable justifications for the constructive trust, even though its
ruling was based on undue influence.4 26
. Another way of explaining the deficiency in the three-element rule is to
recognize that the first element of the rule only pretends to be an essential
characteristic of the remedy. In reality, it limits the remedy to a relatively
limited number of causes of action. 4 27 This restriction is significant because,
as an equitable remedy, the constructive trust requires proof of an established
cause of action.4 28 However, the plaintiff need only prove the elements of a
cause of action justifying specific restitution before enjoying a constructive
trust. 42 9 In Sherer v. Sherer, the Texarkana Court of Appeals described the
constructive trust as "merely the remedy used to grant relief on the underlying
cause of action." 43 0 The court went on to identify some of those causes of
action as ones for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, or unjust
enrichment. 4 3 1
422. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 425. Although the facts in Kinsel did not satisfy the rule's first
element, the Court noted that, "the justification for a constructive trust is not so constrained." See id at
426.
423. See id.
424. See id. (citing KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2015)).
425. See id at 423 (citing Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1948)).
426. See id.
427. In addition to an express trust, fiduciary duties are attached to a limited number of formal
relationships, including those between an attorney and client, principal and agent, and between partners.
See Meyer v. Cathey, 167 S.W.3d 327, 330-31 (Tex. 2005); Gregan v. Kelly, 355 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Courts also impose fiduciary obligations on what they
characterize as informal or confidential relationships that arise from special relationships of trust. See
Meyer, 167 S.W.3d at 331. Actual fraud requires an actor to knowingly make a false, material
representation knowingly made with the intent to induce reliance, and that the representation induce
reliance, and that the reliance injure the victim. See Zorrilla v. AYPCO Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143,
153 (Tex. 2015). A constructive trust can return property gained by a breach ofa confidential relationship,
usually referred to as a claim based on constructive fraud. See Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740
(Tex. 1964). Constructive fraud can also arise from the breach of fiduciary duties even though the party's
actions were not intentionally fraudulent. See Hubbard v. Shankle, 138 S.W.3d 474, 483 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
428. See, e.g., Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 564-65 (Tex. 2014) (plurality opinion)
(equating the terms "claim," "cause of action," and "chose in action" as references to the operable facts
that give rise to a right to recover either a monetary or equitable remedy); Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d
262, 279 (Tex. 2006) (holding that in the absence of a judgment of liability the petitioners' take-nothing
judgment on all claims required reversal of the constructive trust against them).
429. See Sherer v. Sherer, 393 S.W.3d 480, 491 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013, pet. denied).
430. Id.; see David Wright Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 424 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, no pet.); In re Estate of Skinner, 417 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, no pet.).
431. See Sherer,393 S.W.3dat491.
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Because of the history and terminology of equity, laymen assume courts
can just "do equity" without bothering with a recognized cause of Action. 432
Fairness and good conscience certainly played an important role in equity
jurisprudence, but Texas law conditions even equitable remedies on the
satisfaction of a cause of action.43 3 For example, the paradigmatic equitable
remedy is the injunction, but a permanent injunction cannot be granted
without a finding of liability.4 34 Even a temporary injunction requires proof
of established elements, the first of which is a cause of action.435
Although the Court has not expressly established the elements of a
general unjust-enrichment cause of action, it has upheld what it identified as
a judgment for unjust enrichment.436 In HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel,
royalty owners sued HECI, their lessee, to recover a portion of the judgment
HECI recovered against another operator for harm to the common pool. 43 7
The lessors' claim against the other operator was time-barred, and they
contended that HECI had an obligation to notify them of its suit. 438 One of
the lessors' causes of action was for unjust enrichment.4 3 9 The Court held
that because HECI could not have asserted a claim on the lessors' behalf, it
could not be unjustly enriched at their expense. 44 0 The Court did
acknowledge that, "We have recognized that, in some circumstances, a
royalty owner has a cause of action against its lessee based on unjust
enrichment. ... "441 However, HECI had acquired no property in its
settlement that belonged to the Neels.4 2
Having previously recognized the unjust-enrichment cause of action, the
Texas Supreme Court need not go through the formal process of creating
one. 44 3 The Court, in the Kinsel decision, discussed the factors to be
432. See generally id.; David Wright Constr. Co., 424 S.W.3d at 738; In re Estate of Skinner, 417
S.W.3d at 639.
433. See, e.g., Sherer, 393 S.W.3d at 491 (explaining that a constructive trust is a remedy, not a cause
of action, and thereby must be supported by an underlying cause of action).
434. See Etan Indus. Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 625 n.2 (Tex. 2011) (citing Valenzuela v.
Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 514 n.2 (Tex. 1993)) (implying that the practical effect of a constructive trust
results from the court's issuance of a permanent injunction that mandates transfer of the property at issue).
435. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) ("To obtain a temporary
injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the
defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in
the interim.").
436. See Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 685 (Tex. 2000).
437. See HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1990).
438. See id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 891-92. Only a plaintiff with standing can assert a claim for unjust enrichment, and
standing requires proof that the defendant's benefit was acquired either from or at the expense of the
plaintiff See id.
441. Id. at 891. The Court also recognized that "Unjust enrichment was the basis for recovery in
Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.....
Id (citing Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 693
(Tex. 1986)).
442. Id. at 891-92.
443. See id.
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considered in creating a cause of action for tortious interference with an
inheritance.44 4 One important reason that the Court cited for not needing a
new cause of action was the availability of adequate alternatives." 5 The
Court concluded that there was "no compelling reason to consider a
previously unrecognized tort if the constructive trust proved to be an
adequate remedy. 4 46 There are, however, no alternative remedies that would
adequately replace a constructive trust when the defendant would otherwise
be unjustly enriched by the plaintiffs property. 44 7
The Restatement (Third) suggests that liability for restitution depends
on three elements: (1) the defendant has acquired a benefit, (2) at the expense
of the plaintiff, and (3) retention of the benefit would unjustly enrich the
defendant.448 It also makes clear that liability for restitution derives from a
legal process by which a court determines that the defendant's enrichment is
unjustified in the sense that it "lacks an adequate legal basis... ."9 When
the defendant cannot justify his enrichment by retention of property
belonging to the plaintiff, a constructive trust is the most appropriate means
450
order to establish the plaintiffs equitable
In ore
of specific restitution.
ownership, she must prove that the defendant currently possesses specific
451
property acquired from, or at the expense of, the plaintiff.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The three-element rule does not reflect Texas Supreme Court decisions
and, when taken seriously, disserves the public's interest in protecting
property rights. For the reasons discussed, it should be disavowed by Texas
courts. The Court's decision in Kinsel v. Lindsey arguably retained the rule
but only as one of inclusion-that is, the rule describes those instances in
which a constructive trust is clearly justified.4 52 However, it can no longer
be considered a rule of exclusion-that is, it does not describe the only
444.
445.
446.
447.

See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 423-25 (Tex. 2017).
See id. at 424-25.
Id. at 424.
See id. at 424-25.

448. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST. 2011); see also David Dittfurth, Civil Liabilityfor Unjust Enrichment, 54 S. TEX. L. REv. 225, 232
(2012) (discussing these three elements of an unjust-enrichment cause of action).
449. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2011). "Unjust enrichment" may appear to be a characteristic that becomes obvious on the face of
the facts. In reality, the parties must apply legal rules and defenses to reach the conclusion that a
defendant's enrichment is "unjustified." See id (internal citation omitted).
450. See id. at § 55.
451. See Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533 S.W.3d 866, 875-76 (Tex. 2017)
(holding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their tracing obligation by failing to provide evidence showing
which oil and gas leases were acquired as a result of the defendants' alleged breach of fiduciary duty); see
also KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2014); supra text accompanying notes 96102 (detailing how the plaintiff failed to show that the targeted interests were ever owned by her).
452. See Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d at 425-27.
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instances in which a constructive trust is justified. Even as a rule of inclusion,
the rule's many exceptions make it misleading. 453
Instead of these three elements, the Court actually applies two general
requirements with a restriction to protect statutory policies. The two
requirements are tracing and unjust enrichment. In the absence of a
conflicting statute, a plaintiff proves unjust enrichment by showing the
defendant's wrongful acquisition of her property or by showing the lack of
justification for allowing even an innocent defendant to retain that property.
If a statute conferred a benefit on the defendant, his enrichment cannot be
deemed unjust 45 4 unless he used wrongdoing to bring about this result.455
Under these circumstances, proof of wrongdoing becomes necessary to
satisfy the requirement of unjust enrichment and to avoid undermining the
statute.456
This modified rule more accurately describes the Texas Supreme
Court's practice and allows a more transparent and policy-sensitive analysis.
If adopted, it would add clarity to the law, provide greater protection for
property rights, and replace an anachronistic rule that frustrates both of those
purposes.

453.
454.
455.
456.

See supra Part VII (explaining the misleading nature of the three-element rule).
See Holmes v. Kent, 221 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam).
See Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948).
See supra Part V (discussing the function of wrongdoing and when it is necessary).

